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Abstract 
The rising adoption of cloud computing and increasing interconnections among its 
actors lead to the emergence of network-like structures and new associated risks. A 
major obstacle for addressing these risks is the lack of transparency concerning the 
underlying network structure and the dissemination of risks therein. Existing research 
does not consider the risk perspective in a cloud network’s context. We address this 
research gap with the construction of a reference model that can display such networks 
and therefore supports risk identification. We evaluate the reference model through 
real-world examples and interviews with industry experts and demonstrate its 
applicability. The model provides a better understanding of cloud networks and 
causalities between related risks. These insights can be used to develop appropriate risk 
management strategies in cloud networks. The reference model sets a basis for future 
risk quantification approaches as well as for the design of (IT) tools for risk analysis. 
Keywords:  Cloud computing, Cloud Networks, Risk Identification, Reference Model, Taxonomy 
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Introduction 
Cloud computing has emerged as a new outsourcing paradigm during the last few years (Bresnahan et al. 
2011). In 2013, the yearly spending on cloud computing nearly hit the 50 billion dollar mark and is 
expected to climb up to over 100 billion dollars in 2017 (IDC 2013). Accompanied by rising adoption, the 
inherent risks of cloud computing must be addressed. Recent IS research examines these risks, for 
example, see Armbrust et al. (2009), Troshani et al. (2011), or Clarke (2012a). Additionally, risk avoiding 
strategies like multi-sourcing (AlZain et al. 2012) or attack avoiding strategies (Zissis and Lekkas 2012) 
are described and may be progressively adopted in practice. Therefore in the future, even more companies 
will dare to move into the cloud when cloud computing has overcome its current Trough of 
Disillusionment (Linden and Fenn 2003) with the guidance of IS research. 
The increasing adoption of cloud services and rising interconnections among actors in cloud computing 
lead to the emergence of network-like structures in the cloud business. These structures are similar to 
complex supply networks known from the manufacturing industries (compare Hallikas et al. 2002). In the 
following, we will refer to these structures as cloud networks. 
Besides “traditional” cloud computing risks that mostly focus on a vendor or a customer, new network-
induced kinds of risk are emerging and should be addressed by adequate risk management practices, 
anchored in IT governance. An incident at one place can lead to cascading effects that affect many other 
participants in the network. Cloud networks may adopt some characteristics and risks of supply chain 
networks or even the financial industry (compare Buyya et al. (2008)). In 2011, for example, an outage of 
Amazon EC2 occurred which affected many of its customers (Clarke 2012b). Among them were Heroku, 
Engine Yard, and DotCloud, which build their platform services on Amazon’s EC2 infrastructure services 
and provide them to other companies like ASICS or Audi that were consequently not able to provide their 
built-on application services to their respective customers (Harris 2011). 
One major obstacle for addressing these risks in cloud networks is the lack of knowledge on the 
underlying network structure and thus, the possible risks. Without this knowledge, no appropriate risk 
management strategy can be applied. Until now, the existing literature on risks in cloud computing 
focuses mostly on compliance and general risk management approaches as well as on identification and 
quantification of risks for a specific company. For example, Martens and Teuteberg (2011) designed a 
reference model for risk and compliance management for cloud services. Wherein the authors aim to 
“support companies in managing and reducing risk and compliance efforts” (Martens and Teuteberg 
2011). They provide a UML (OMG 2011) class diagram that describes the required components of cloud 
risk management in companies. Armbrust et al. (2009) or Dillon et al. (2010) focus on the risk 
identification from a technological point of view at the customer side. Several authors provide approaches 
to measure cloud risks. For example, Harnisch and Buxmann (2013) evaluate cloud services with methods 
of supplier selection and Saripalli and Walters (2010) propose a quantitative impact and risk assessment 
framework for cloud security. However, we have not found any approaches that examine risks of cloud 
computing from a network perspective. Authors that do focus on cloud networks, such as Böhm et al. 
(2010), Marinos and Briscoe (2009), or Bleizeffer et al. (2011), do not consider risks in their approaches. 
In this paper, we will answer the following research questions as a first step to address this lack of 
knowledge: 
RQ1: What actors exist in cloud networks? 
RQ2: What risks affect the actors of cloud networks? 
On this basis, we construct a reference model that contributes to the understanding of the nexus of 
globally distributed cloud networks and its respective risks. The goal of a reference model is to cover 
“general patterns in order to raise the efficiency and effectiveness of specific modeling processes” (Vom 
Brocke and Thomas 2006). In line with Hevner et al. (2004), we build our reference model as a specific 
“artifact” and evaluate it in the course of our search process, which is similar to the approach of 
Knackstedt et al. (2009). In order to “enhance the quality” of our reference model, we follow the 
“guidelines of modeling” by Schuette and Rotthowe (1998). We use a slightly simplified version of UML 
(OMG 2011) as a semi-formal modeling language for information modeling in order to describe our 
artifacts in a clear and comprehensible manner. We examine actors and risks of cloud networks and 
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display them in tree based structures through generalizations in UML class diagrams. These two 
taxonomies (RQ1 and RQ2) build a solid basis for our reference model. The taxonomies are grounded on 
existing literature in cloud computing and related literature from other disciplines, such as supply chain 
networks or the financial industry, and then elaborated with our own critical reflection. We develop the 
reference model by identifying connections between actors and the causalities between different risks, 
respectively. The taxonomies are evaluated trough real world examinations following a conceptual-to-
empirical approach proposed by Nickerson et al. (2013). In addition, we discussed the taxonomies with 
industry experts to guarantee the reflection of existing market structures. The reference model is also 
evaluated in discussions with industry experts. Furthermore, we elaborate the reference model through 
instantiation on the basis of a real world example to demonstrate its applicability. We used the insights 
from the interviews to improve the taxonomies and the reference model. Due to the limited space, we only 
illustrate the final versions of our reference model and the partial models. We describe the iteration steps 
of improvement in the evaluation section. 
On the basis of our reference model, the dissemination of risks throughout the cloud network can be 
examined. In this context, dissemination describes the passing on of a risk from one actor to another 
whereby the first actor still is affected. Practitioners can display relevant actors and structures in cloud 
networks. By using the reference model as a template and instantiating it for their specific scenarios, they 
can identify impending risks. In addition, the reference models supports a better understanding of the 
effects of risks on the holistic system. Referring to the risk cycle of Zhang et al. (2010), our reference 
model enables practitioners to select relevant critical areas and identify the respective occurring risks. The 
reference model displayed in a semi-formal diagram sets a basis for future risk quantification approaches 
as well as for the design of (IT) tools for risk analysis. On this basis, appropriate risk management 
strategies can be developed. 
The paper is structured as follows: To address the problem relevance, we outline the development towards 
cloud networks in Section 2. In Section 3 and 4, we develop a taxonomy of actors in cloud networks and a 
taxonomy of risks in cloud networks. In Section 5, we create two partial models based on the two 
taxonomies. Finally, we merge these two partial models to the reference model. In Section 6, we provide 
an evaluation of the taxonomies and the reference model. In Section 7, we discuss implications, address 
the applicability of the model and provide an outlook on future research. 
Developments towards Cloud Networks 
In addition to the increasing adoption of cloud services, we observe new developments in cloud 
computing. These developments lead to the aforementioned emergence of cloud networks: 
• First, a trend towards an increasing standardization in cloud computing exists (Vaquero et al. 2009), 
strengthening the interchangeability of cloud services between different actors in cloud computing. In 
an outlook on future market structures, Buyya et al. (2008) describe cloud exchanges with brokers that 
trade standardized cloud products.  
• Second, the specialization of cloud services increases to provide software for specific “intended user 
groups” such as private users or specific business groups (Höfer and Karagiannis 2010). Due to low 
barriers to market entry (Clemons and Chen 2011), a huge variation of application services surfaces.  
• Third, the dependencies among actors in cloud networks are rising. These dependencies are caused by 
the aforementioned developments as well as the concept of multi sourcing in the cloud to prevent 
outages, as suggested by Armbrust et al. (2009) and analyzed by König et al. (2013). 
In addition, new market structures and actors emerge in cloud computing. Some companies developed to 
large players in cloud computing during the last years, such as Amazon, Salesforce, or Microsoft. On the 
one hand, the variety of offerings on the infrastructure as a service (IaaS) market shrinks as the large 
players offer lower prices and higher availability than mid-size infrastructure providers could ever achieve 
(Harris 2014). On the other hand, the variety of software as a service (SaaS) offerings enlarges. This leads 
to a market with a lack of transparency where many different actors depend on only a few. In this market, 
we observe the genesis of new business models like the Deutsche Boerse Cloud Exchange or the 
Massachusetts Open Cloud project as an exchange platform for standardized infrastructure services, or 
VMware Service Market Place and the HP Aggregation Platform which offer software and platform 
services. Actors in cloud computing are now able to outsource specialized functions (Troshani et al. 2011). 
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Thereby, they can focus on their core competencies by consuming other specialized cloud services in 
order to simplify their operational business or enhance their own service offerings. Vendors may, for 
example, use payment handling services and development platform services from other cloud actors to 
provide their own application services. Market places strengthen the bonding between actors of a cloud 
network, while facilitating a rapid exchange of cloud services. This development is especially displayed in 
standardized interfaces in cloud market places and in a strong movement towards standardization, 
pushed forward by organizations such as the “Cloud Standards Customer Council” with important 
industry players like IBM or Symantec (Cloud Standards Customer Council 2014). The emergence of 
cloud exchange markets will in turn additionally strengthen the drive for standardization of cloud 
services (see Buyya et al. (2008)). 
These developments are likely to transform the current cloud landscape towards complex, globally 
distributed cloud networks, consisting of many different actors and connections. In these cloud networks, 
risks can disseminate between different actors. For example, Microsoft Yammer, an enterprise social 
network that supports collaboration between employees, uses the cloud service Crocodoc to convert PDF 
and Microsoft Word Documents into HTML5. Crocodoc itself is hosted by Amazon Web Services (AWS). 
Hence, the services from Microsoft depends to some extent on the availability of AWS. A recently emerged 
risk occurred after Facebook bought Instagram and released new license agreements. The emerging bad 
publicity on Instagram pushed many users to services of competitors. These competitors were then 
struggling to provide the required infrastructure resources in short-term to keep their services running 
(Laurent 2013). 
Taxonomy of Actors in Cloud Networks 
Several cloud computing taxonomies exist in IS literature, such as Hoefer and Karagiannis (2010), Hoefer 
and Karagiannis (2011), or Rimal et al. (2009). These taxonomies classify cloud services in terms of 
technical properties. In contrast to these approaches, we focus on the business perspective of cloud 
computing. Within this perspective, we only consider actors that participate in the production of cloud 
services and therefore provide, process, or transmit services in cloud networks. As a basis for the 
construction of our taxonomy, we refer to Böhm et al. (2010) who address “the business perspective of IT 
provisioning”, and extend it with results of other authors. Leimeister et al. (2010) describe the value 
transfer between actors in cloud computing. In addition, we use the differentiation of provisioning models 
that is described by Marinos and Briscoe (2009). They identify “vendors”, “developers”, and “end users” 
as actors related to IaaS, platform as a service (PaaS), and SaaS, which are described in detail in the 
ontology of Youseff et al. (2008). Marinos and Briscoe (2009) state that a “vendor” provides IaaS, PaaS, 
and SaaS whereas the “developer” consumes IaaS and PaaS and provides SaaS. The “end user” consumes 
SaaS. We adopt this “input/output” view for our classification logic. 
As mentioned earlier, cloud networks may share some characteristics with supply chain networks and the 
financial industry. Regarding supply chain literature, such as Lambert et al. (1998) or Harland (1996), we 
identified equivalents to the actors that are already described in the literature on cloud computing. In a 
supply chain network, many customer/vendor relationships exist, including value-adding steps between 
the stages of the production process. Each producer is able to produce goods parallel or sequential to 
other producers. We adopt the way of distinguishing actors between the respective positions in the 
network and between the respective products. Regarding the financial industry, the interconnections of 
banks and other financial institutions with their respective dependencies can be compared to the 
interconnections among cloud services to some extent. Information is exchanged in real time and is often 
organized as an on demand self-service. Certain actors, such as the exchange market or 
aggregator/broker, already exist or are evolving in cloud computing. From the financial industry we 
additionally adopt the actor “market place” and the idea of a liquid market where standardized cloud 
services are exchanged. 
Our taxonomy is based on existing literature with a focus on the business perspective and extended with 
our own observations. Within the taxonomy, we categorize the actors with the help of three layers: 
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• In a Position Layer, we distinguish between the positions of the actors in a cloud network. A Provider is 
the first node in the network whereas the Client represents the final node. Between these nodes we 
identified Intermediaries that use services produced by other participants of the cloud network, 
enhance or aggregate these services, and provide them afterwards to their own customers.  
• In a Business Model Layer, we distinguish within the three categories of the position layer and consider 
the different business models of the respective actors. We regard Initial Producers, Value-Added 
Resellers, and Catalysts which strengthen the interconnections among cloud actors and increase the 
frequency and easiness of interactions (like market liquidity) in the cloud network. 
• A Product Layer specifies the actors by the respective provided product. Therefore we use the technical 
layers of cloud computing (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS). In addition, we introduce the Aggregator as a new form 
of a Value-Added Reseller.  
In order to address research question RQ1, we illustrate the hierarchical taxonomy of actors in a UML 
class diagram in Figure 1 through generalizations. A generalization represents an “is a” relationship 
whereby a specific element “inherits the features of the more general” element (OMG 2011). The 
taxonomy contains all identified Actors, layers, and inheritance between the layers. The classes of the 
Position Layer inherit from the super-class Actor. The classes of the Business Model Layer inherit from 
the super-classes in the Position Layer. The classes of the Product Layer inherit from the super-classes in 
the Business Model Layer. It can be read as follows: An Aggregator is a Value-Added Reseller is an 
Intermediary is an Actor. We explain the identified Actors in detail on a Product Layer level in Table 1 in 
the appendix.  
Figure 1.  Taxonomy of Actors 
Taxonomy of Risks in Cloud Networks 
Clarke (2010) states that the risks of cloud computing are similar to those of in-house operations yet more 
opaque. Grobauer et al. (2011) propose a taxonomy of the general term risk, which implies “loss event 
frequency and probable loss magnitude”. Many authors examine the risks of cloud computing but only a 
few address risks in cloud networks. Nevertheless, these examinations described below serve as a solid 
basis for our taxonomy of risks in cloud networks. Clarke (2012a) provides a checklist that lists risks and 
benefits of cloud computing in sub-categories. The author distinguishes between operational, contingent, 
security, commercial, and compliance risks. Troshani et al. (2011) divide cloud failure risks in technical 
risks, like data transit risk or malicious activities, and organizational risks, like lock-in or security and 
privacy risks. Jansen (2011) identifies six key security issues, namely trust, architecture, identity 
management, software isolation, data protection and availability, while explicitly describing cascading 
outages in cloud networks in the latter case. AlZain et al. (2012) identify three main cloud security risks, 
namely data integrity, data intrusion, and service availability. Armbrust et al. (2009) discuss obstacles for 
cloud computing, including for example the availability of the service, data lock-in, data confidentiality 
and auditability, data transfer bottlenecks, performance unpredictability, or reputation fate sharing. 
Moreover, Clarke (2012b) examines real world cloud reliability issues from 2005-2011. 
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Again, we take a look at the areas of supply chain networks and the financial industry. Regarding supply 
chain networks, Hallikas et al. (2004) identify the four types of risks “too low or inappropriate demand”, 
“problems in fulfilling customer deliveries”, “cost management and pricing”, and “weakness in resources, 
development, and flexibility”. For cloud networks, we can adopt the risk of shifts in demand and of a lack 
of flexibility. Prater (2005) distinguishes between eight uncertainty factors. From that, we borrow 
“variable uncertainty” which covers factors such as weather, market behavior, or political influence 
factors. We also adopt the described parallel supply chain effects that refer to the dependency on several 
input goods with the possibility of missing input. In addition, chaotic demand peaks can be caused by 
wrongly conditioned enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. This may also be relevant for cloud 
networks. In the financial industry, the term risk refers especially to “uncertain environmental variables 
that reduce performance predictability, as well as the lack of predictability in firm outcomes itself” (Miller 
1992). These variables encompass general environmental, industry, and firm-specific risks (Miller 1992). 
Many of the thereby included risks are also found in literature on cloud risks, especially legal 
uncertainties (Armbrust et al. 2010; Jansen 2011) and input market specific uncertainties such as outages 
(Armbrust et al. 2010; Chow et al. 2009; Clarke 2010; Jansen 2011). In addition, we adopt the risk of 
unexpected demand shifts or price changes from the financial industry. 
The literature on cloud computing does not use the term risk uniformly. In order to create a taxonomy of 
risks, we refer to Kaplan and Garrick (1981) who differentiate between Hazard and Risk. We adopt this 
“cause-and-effect” view for our taxonomy: 
• A Hazard describes the “source of danger” (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). It strikes directly at a specific 
actor and affects its service. The thereby caused resulting Risk is measurable at the actor’s customers, 
which are, for example, unable to use the respective cloud service as an input factor. The likelihood of 
the occurrence of a Hazard may be influenced by safeguards.  
• A Risk “involves both uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage that might be received” (Kaplan and 
Garrick 1981). 
• In addition to Hazards and Risks, we introduce Reinforcers, which are caused by the underlying 
network structure and can alter the measurable Risks. 
Companies are mostly concerned about securing supply and steady prices of their pre-products. The 
derived basic risks are Supply Risk and Price Risk, whereas the Supply Risk in cloud computing can be 
divided in Loss of Data and Availability Issues. In addition to these two Risks, we consider Data Issues 
because the transferred good is information. We divide Data Issues in Data Security and Data Privacy. 
Hazards mostly describe the “traditional risks” of cloud computing like Technical Defects, yet also include 
Shifts in Demand and Supply, which may be provoked by strategic decisions of companies. Reinforcers 
include network specific circumstances that become relevant if risks occur. In addition, Automation 
Errors in service provisioning systems may also intensify other risks. We use the term Challenges as a 
super-category for Hazards, Risks, and Reinforcers as these three categories represent challenges for a 
risk management in cloud networks. In order to address research question RQ2, we display the 
hierarchical taxonomy of risks in a UML class diagram with all identified Hazards, Risks, and Reinforcers 
in Figure 2. All sub-classes inherit from their super-classes. It can be read as follows: Data Security is a 
Data Issue is a Risk is a Challenge. We provide further information on all classes in Table 2 in the 
appendix. 
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Figure 2.  Taxonomy of Risks 
Developing the Reference Model 
We now construct the reference model, which is based on the taxonomies, in the following three steps: 
First, we identify the Connections between Actors in cloud networks that span a network, in a partial 
model. Second, we identify the causalities between Hazards, Risks, and Reinforcers in a partial model. 
Third, we assign the Hazards, Risks, and Reinforcers to specific Actors and display the possible 
dissemination of risks through a spanned network. 
We constitute that the network consists solely of Actors and Connections between these Actors. In our 
reference model, Actors and Connections are vital parts of the network and do not exist without the 
network, which is displayed with the use of compositions. Further, in reality, one Company might appear 
as various Actors due to a manifold cloud service offering, which is again displayed with the use of a 
composition. Google, for example, acts as Initial Application Provider (GMail), Initial Platform Provider 
(Google App Engine), and as Aggregator (Google News). The Connection symbolizes the “uses a service 
from” (from the perspective of a customer) or “service is used by” (from the perspective of a vendor) 
relation between a vendor and a customer. Our identified structure in the reference model implicates the 
assumption that an Actor usually does not consume a service and provides it without processing. This 
assumption is based on the existence of administration costs that raise the price of the actor’s product 
above the price of the original product. The Connections between the respective actor classes at the 
position layer are represented by association classes. In order to guarantee easy readability, we removed 
the cardinalities from the association classes. All Connections represent n-m relationships between the 
respective Actors. From this it follows that one Actor can provide a service for various other Actors (a very 
common case) and various Actors can provide services for one Actor (allowing for the depiction of 
diversification strategies using backup/failover providers). Below this abstraction layer, the Actors do not 
behave differently in terms of their interaction. In Figure 3, we illustrate the partial model of actors in 
cloud networks. 
As clarified above, Hazards describe the cause of a Risk, whereas Reinforcers may increase the damage or 
the probability of a Risk. A Risk can be caused by various Hazards and a Hazard can cause several Risks, 
which equals an n-m relationship. Again, we removed these cardinalities from the association class to 
guarantee easy readability. The same is valid for the “cause-and-effect” relationship between Reinforcers 
and Risks. The sub-classes of Hazards, Risks, and Reinforcers inherit this feature from their super-
classes. However, Hazards and Reinforcers have different effects on different Risks. For example, the 
Incompability cannot reinforce the Data Security Issues. In Table 3 and Table 4 in the appendix, we 
illustrate the possible combinations which have been elaborated by our own critical reflection. In Figure 4, 
we illustrate the partial model of challenges. 
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Figure 3.  Partial Model of Actors in Cloud Networks Figure 4.  Partial Model of Challenges 
We join the two partial models to a reference model. We illustrate the dependencies between Risks and 
Hazards/Reinforcers as association classes. A basic characteristic of our reference model is that Risks can 
be disseminated from one Actor to another through a specific Connection. Generally, Risks are 
disseminated from vendor to customer. This dissemination is represented in our reference model through 
methods in the Connection class. Specific Hazards strike at specific Actors in the cloud network. Also, 
specific Risks can be detected at specific Actors in the cloud network. Therefore we assign the Risks and 
Hazards classes to the Actor class. The Reinforcers are determined by the class Cloud Network.  
A Hazard strikes at a specific Actor and therefore affects the Actor’s cloud service output. The Actor’s 
customers using this service as input are able to measure the thereby caused Risk. If this Risk affects the 
cloud service output of the customer, the Risk is in turn disseminated to the customer’s customer which 
again can detect the Risk. For example, in case of a Technical Defect at the Initial Platform Provider A, A 
fails to deliver the service correctly. Therefore Application Reseller B using this service can detect 
Availability Issues such as outages or bad performance. The Availability Issue may also affect the 
produced application services by B and in turn be disseminated to Aggregator C which uses B’s service 
for the assembly of its own offerings. At B and C, the Risk might even be worsened through a Lock-In. In 
Figure 5, we illustrate the developed final reference model. 
 
Figure 5.  Reference Model to Support Risk Identification in Cloud Networks 
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Evaluation 
As proposed by Schuette and Rotthowe (1998), our artifact is based on the body of existing literature in 
the field of cloud computing and other relevant disciplines. We constructed two taxonomies and used 
them as the foundation for our reference model. To evaluate our findings, we first evaluated the individual 
taxonomies. Second, we evaluated the reference model. For this purpose we applied a “multi-method” 
approach (Martens and Teuteberg 2011). For the taxonomies we used real world examples and, in 
accordance with Gregor and Hevner (2013), conducted semi-structured interviews with industry experts 
from focus group companies. For the reference model, we again conducted interviews with the industry 
experts and additionally instantiated the reference model with real world actors to demonstrate its 
applicability. We critically discussed any feedback received in the interviews with other researchers before 
incorporating it into our models, presented in the sections above.  
For interviewee selection, we identified possible interview partners that (i) represented different kinds of 
actors in cloud networks and therefore covered a “wide spectrum of expert knowledge” (Martens and 
Teuteberg 2011) and (ii) could be considered “domain experts” with “expertise in the cloud computing 
area” (Boehm et al. 2010) due to holding important positions with several years of experience in the 
respective companies. We were able to conduct interviews with two available interviewees from two 
different companies. Their diverse business models and perspectives on cloud computing support a 
reasonable generalizability of our reference model. Our first interview partner is the CEO of company X. 
This company is a small sized customizing partner of Y, one of the world’s largest SaaS ERP providers, 
and uses several cloud-based third-party add-ins which offer specific functionalities. Y hosts its services in 
the United States, whereas company X is located in Germany. The interview partner has extensive 
knowledge regarding dependencies among cloud services through several years of experience in 
customizing SaaS services for X’s customers. Our second interview partner is the Head of IT Architecture 
of Company Z. This company is one of the world’s largest, globally acting IT service providers. Offerings 
range from IaaS to SaaS in trusted public, private, and hybrid cloud environments for large commercial 
and governmental organizations. During the last year, the company invested approximately 2 billion 
dollar in their cloud-based developments. The interview partner has profound knowledge in the field of 
cloud services through years of experience in purchasing cloud services for the internal use in company Z, 
as well as through responsibility for the availability of the necessary IT resources for external cloud service 
consumers. 
Concerning the problem relevance, both interview partners confirmed the developments towards cloud 
networks as well as the resulting lack of transparency and newly emerging risks. They particularly 
underlined the trend towards standardization of infrastructure services. Company X’s customers consider 
availability and geographical location of the stored data to be main concerns. Many customers therefore 
implement local safeguards such as physically independent internet connections. However, the customers 
of company X do not usually address cloud network related risks. Company Z considers the loss of data 
and outages of cloud services to be major concerns. They propose multi-vendor sourcing and detailed 
service level agreements as safeguards to cope with these issues. 
Evaluation of the Taxonomies 
We discussed our taxonomies with the industry experts from company X and Z. We then incorporated the 
respective gained insights into the taxonomies. In the following, we illustrate some annotations of the 
experts with regard to our former artifacts:  
• An interview partner noted that many companies in cloud networks might appear as various Actors at 
the same time. To overcome this issue, we came up with the class Company that consists of 1-n Actors. 
• Regarding the taxonomy of risks in cloud networks, an interview partner felt that a formerly depicted 
hazard Bad Reputation is a type of Demand Risk. 
• Another issue was that our former distinction of Data Issues was not exact enough. Hence, we divided 
the respective risk Data Security (now Data Issues) into Data Security and Data Privacy.  
• An interview partner remarked that performance issues could be a cause of a Supply Risk. We followed 
this advice by renaming the Risk Outages to Availability Issues which now also contains performance 
issues. 
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• Both interview partners confirmed the completeness of the taxonomy of actors and risks in cloud 
networks for their purposes and based on their expertise. Furthermore, all changes were discussed with 
other researchers. 
In addition, we applied a conceptual to empirical approach described by Nickerson et al. (2013) during 
the construction of our taxonomies, which includes an evaluation through the identification of real world 
examples for the illustrated sub-classes. After several cycles of elaborating our taxonomies, we sufficiently 
matched the objective and subjective ending conditions described by Nickerson et al. (2013). Regarding 
the objective ending condition “every characteristic must be explained by an example”, we could not find 
real world examples for the risks Price Risk and Data Security Issues. Information about such problems 
does usually not go public. However, the interview partners confirmed the existence of these risks. We 
could also not find real world examples for Infrastructure Reseller and Platform Market Place. As the 
developments towards cloud networks are still ongoing, not every described actor is already in business 
and therefore cannot be observed right now. However, our models are meant to include near future 
market structures in cloud computing. Therefore, we tried to explain circumstances under which such 
actors may likely exist in the near future. The interview partners confirmed the high likeliness of these 
actors. In addition to these objective ending conditions, we and our interview partners felt that the 
taxonomies had reached a state where they now were concise, robust, comprehensive, extendible, and 
explanatory (subjective ending condition). In Table 1 in the appendix, we illustrate the actors of cloud 
networks with a textual description and the identified real world examples. In Table 2 of the appendix, we 
illustrate the risks of cloud networks with a textual description and the identified real world examples. 
Evaluation of the Reference Model 
We discussed our reference model with the industry experts from company X and Z. Again, we then 
incorporated the respective gained insights into the reference model. In the following, we illustrate some 
annotations of the experts with regard to our former artifact: 
• An interview partner annotated that the former illustration was very complex and required a long 
settling-in period. We were able to simplify the illustration by moving the direct connections between 
the actors and the associated risks into the association classes, which are now displayed in Table 3 and 
Table 4 in the appendix. The new illustration now allows an easier and more comprehensive adaption 
by practitioners without losing too much expressiveness in its depiction. 
• A former version of our reference model allowed actors to disseminate hazards to other actors. An 
interview partner suggested that we should consider the dissemination of the respective risk itself. After 
discussions with other researchers we adopted this suggestion and adjusted our reference model 
accordingly.  
• Both interview partners developed a good understanding of the reference model and described it as 
reasonable and applicable. Furthermore, all changes were discussed with other researchers. 
Next, we demonstrate the applicability of our reference model by instantiating it with real world actors. In 
order to remain consistent with the UML class diagram, we use an UML object diagram. We chose the 
already described dependencies between Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Yammer and expanded it with SAP 
Spotlight which is another customer of Crocodoc. In our example, we look at a Client “ACME” which 
consumes services of the two Application Resellers Yammer and SAP Spotlight to support its business 
operations. We assume that the datacenters of Amazon and Microsoft are located in the same area and 
therefore are both affected by a blackout due to a lightning storm (Natural Disaster). Subsequently, 
Amazon causes risks (Price Risk, Loss of Data, and Availability Issues) at their customer Crocodoc that in 
turn disseminates the risks to its customers Yammer and SAP Spotlight. Yammer and Spotlight are able to 
measure these Risks that affect their service input. At the same time, the affected Microsoft Servers cause 
Risks (Price Risk, Loss of Data, and Availability Issues) at Yammer. As Yammer consumes services from 
Amazon EC2 and the Microsoft Servers, the Hazard affects Yammer even more. We speak of the 
Reinforcer “Geological Distribution of Network Actors”. This Reinforcer worsens the magnitude of 
Yammer’s Risks. In the following, the Risks at Yammer and SAP Spotlight are disseminated through the 
cloud network until the last node (company ACME) is affected. In addition, we assume a user mistake 
(User Error) at SAP Spotlight. Therefore, this actor also causes Risks (Loss of Data, Availability Issues, 
Data Security, and Data Privacy) at company ACME. These Risks add up to the Risks disseminated from 
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the lightning storm (Price Risk, Loss of Data, and Availability Issues). We illustrate this instantiation of 
our reference model in Figure 6. The depicted model provides transparency on the existing dependencies. 
The dissemination of risks through the cloud network can be displayed and the respective actors are able 
to identify the impending risks. 
Figure 6.  Instantiation of the Reference Model 
Implications, Applicability, and Future Research 
In our paper, we describe ongoing developments in cloud computing, such as standardization, 
specialization, rising dependencies, new actors, and new market structures. These developments are likely 
to transform the current cloud landscape into complex, globally distributed cloud networks with new 
emerging risks. In order to provide a better understanding of the underlying structure and the inherent 
risks, we develop taxonomies of actors and risks in cloud networks (RQ1 and RQ2). On this basis, we build 
a reference model based on UML class diagrams that can be instantiated and supports risk identification 
in cloud networks. We evaluate the taxonomies and the reference model through real world examples and 
interviews with industry experts. 
Cloud networks are participant governed networks in which, regarding governance, no clear 
responsibilities are yet determined. As cloud networks become more complex and the number of 
participants increases, there is a need for cloud network governance which, considering the research of 
Provan and Kenis (2007), might be best addressed by a network administrative organization. Zissis and 
Lekkas (2012) also propose a trusted third party to enforce cloud governance. However, as the 
implementation of an institution that will provide a holistic cloud network governance may need some 
years, practitioners need to address the prevailing risks on their own in the meantime. In both ways, clear 
defined cloud network governance principles and processes are needed. Therefore, existing approaches 
from a single company view may be adapted, e.g. Guo et al. (2010) or Zhang et al. (2010). Also, existing 
knowledge on network governance (e.g. Jones et al 1997 and Provian and Kenis 2007) or supply chain 
governance (e.g. Bitran et al. 2006, Gereffi et al. 2005, Richley et al. 2010, and Wathne and Heide 2004) 
could be incorporated. 
Following the risk cycle of Zhang et al. (2010), which is based in the NIST Risk management guide 
(Stoneburner et al. 2002), risk analysis (or risk identification) is an essential step in terms of risk 
management and should also be part of risk management in a network (Hallikas et al. 2004). The 
reference model could be applied by practitioners in terms of a government process that coordinates 
“cloud-based services management and policy implement across the enterprise” (Guo et al. 2010). More 
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specific, the reference model enables practitioners to select relevant critical areas and identify the 
respective occurring risks (Zhang et al. 2010). In addition, it provides a depiction of actors in the cloud 
network and thereby the implementation of “threat identification” (Zhang et al. 2010). Concluding, the 
reference model provides practitioners and researchers with a better understanding of the nexus of cloud 
networks and related risks, thereby supporting risk identification: 
• Relevant actors and structures in cloud networks can be displayed and thereby impending risks can be 
identified. 
• The dissemination of risks throughout cloud networks can be examined. 
Considering its application, responsibility for instantiating the reference model in the course of 
implementing cloud network governance structures lies with the individual participants of the cloud 
network for now. To instantiate the reference model for their own specific eco-system, practitioners need 
to gather information on actors and hazards. Similar to the existence of industry-specific associations in 
supply chains like e.g. the automotive industry, which provide information on possible suppliers (Choi 
and Hartley 1996), cloud industry-specific associations may arise in the future which might be used for 
information gathering on relevant actors. In addition, information on actors can originate from 
information pages of respective actors, from communication with respective actors, from cloud 
marketplace directories (e.g. Amazon Web Services Marketplace 2014), or from publicly available 
research results (e.g. CloudServiceMarket 2014). In the future, there may be some kind of automated 
information interchange on the underlying network as it is already practiced in supply chain networks 
today (compare Spekman et al. 1998). Information on hazards may be a bit harder to obtain as cloud 
actors have no interest in making these events publicly available. Hence, our taxonomy of risks could be 
used as a guideline for examining possible hazards. Also, cloud industry-specific media reports on past 
events might serve as an indicator for prevailing hazards. We argue, that even the instantiation with 
limited obtainable information in a rather small cloud eco-system should provide added value in terms of 
risk management in cloud networks as it will shed some light on at least a part of the existing risks, 
thereby making risk mitigation possible. Yet, the development of a detailed risk analysis process for cloud 
network governance, including the reference model as a necessary step, is subject to further research. 
Cloud computing is a highly dynamic market. Many new market structures and challenges may change 
during the next several years. Therefore the validity of our current model cannot be guaranteed for the 
future and will be subject to continuous adjustment and development. Furthermore, as of now, we have 
only modeled one real-world example. In future research, we will collaborate with more practitioners and 
experts in order to further examine relevant actors and challenges and to display more partial cloud 
networks. These partial views could be connected to a large “cloud network map” that displays the 
dependencies among many existing cloud actors. With the identified causalities between hazards, risks, 
and reinforcers and the identified dissemination of risks modeled as a semi-formal diagram, we have set a 
basis for risk quantification approaches. In the next step, we will apply existing criticality measures to 
identify the key actors in cloud networks. Subsequently, we want to develop new cloud network specific 
risk measures and our reference model could serve as a basis for the development of an IT tool for risk 
quantification. The estimation of possible input values for this tool could be subject to future empirical 
research. After gaining knowledge on existing risks and their possible impact, we are planning on 
developing and evaluating safeguards addressing the identified risks. Thereby, the effect of different types 
of risks and actors on the respective appropriate risk management strategy could also be investigated 
further. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Description of Actors 
Actor Description 
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Applications encompass software, web apps, or internet services, often summarized as SaaS, which 
are developed and made available on the provider’s own infrastructure. The Initial Application 
Provider provides the “appropriate hardware and software infrastructure to run the service and the 
people to manage and maintain this infrastructure” (Bleizeffer et al. 2011). Services are provided to 
0…n Intermediaries and 0…n Clients. 
Examples: Microsoft Office 365, Google Mail. 
In
it
ia
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P
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rm
 P
ro
v
. Initial Platform Providers offer an “environment within which cloud applications can be deployed” 
(Leimeister et al. 2010), including an operating environment, application programming interfaces 
(APIs), programming languages and so on (Boehm et al. 2010). The Initial Platform Provider uses 
its own infrastructure to provide its platform. Services are provided to 0…n Intermediaries and 0…n 
Clients. 
Examples: Microsoft Windows Azure, Google App Engine. 
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Initial Infrastructure Providers provide IT resources such as “storing and processing capacity” 
(Vaquero et al. 2008). They are usually “companies with other web activities that require large 
computing resources” (Marinos and Briscoe 2009) and benefit from its economies of scale. 
Subcategories are the Initial Computing Provider and the Initial Storage Provider. Both provide 
services to 0…n Intermediaries and 0…n Clients. 
Initial Computing Provider: Amazon EC2, Rackspace Cloud Servers. 
Initial Storage Provider: Amazon S3, Rackspace Cloud Databases. 
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The output of an Application Reseller is similar to the output of an Initial Application Provider, 
whereas the Application Reseller accesses services which encompass “hardware and infrastructure 
of the infrastructure providers” (Leimeister et al. 2010) or other application or platform services as 
pre-products and “adds value on top of a given service to ensure some specific capability” (Boehm et 
al. 2010). However, today’s most common form is a self-hosted service that consumes other services 
as add-ins. An Application Reseller provides services to 0…n Intermediaries and 0…n Clients and 
receives services from 0…n Providers and 0…n Intermediaries. 
Examples:  Crocodoc, Netflix, Talentsoft. 
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The output of a Platform Reseller is similar to the output of an Initial Platform Provider, whereas 
the Platform Reseller accesses computing power or data storage of the Initial Infrastructure 
Providers or other platform services as pre-products. A Platform Reseller provides services to 0…n 
Intermediaries and 0…n Clients and receives services from 0...n Providers and 0…n Intermediaries. 
Examples: Heroku, Bitbucket. 
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 The Infrastructure Reseller buys and sells infrastructure services. It is a virtual actor and nowadays 
may not exist. Infrastructure is a standardized commodity thus value can’t be added. Markets of 
commodities are usually liquid and buying and selling an identical service leads to losses due to 
transaction costs. The optimization of load balancing between internal and external resources, as 
described by Armbrust et al. (2009), may be a special case when the reselling of infrastructure 
makes economic sense. An Infrastructure Reseller provides services to 0…n Intermediaries and 0…n 
Clients and receives services from 0...n Providers and 0…n Intermediaries. 
We are not able to show this actor in a real world example due to missing insight in the internal 
optimization of Initial Infrastructure Providers. However, our interview partners confirmed the 
likeliness of its (future) existence. 
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An Aggregator generates value through the aggregation of services without adding new 
functionalities to existing services. The Aggregator ensures “that the different services work together 
neatly and that no losses occur via data movement between the systems” (Boehm et al. 2010). An 
Aggregator provides services to 0…n Intermediaries and 0…n Clients and receives services from 
0...n Providers and 0…n Intermediaries. 
Examples: HP Aggregation Platform for SaaS, Zapier. 
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An Application Market Place matches customer demand with vendor offerings. Its main objective is 
to “bring customers and service providers together” (Boehm et al. 2010). It offers decision support 
for the customer through comparing various cloud services “based on certain selection criteria” 
(Boehm et al. 2010). The Application Market Place could offer additional benefits to both service 
providers and customers, such as SLA contracting or billing (Boehm et al. 2010). An Application 
Market Place links services of 0…n Intermediaries or 0…n Providers to 0...n Intermediaries or 0…n 
Clients. Independent from this, the Application Market Place may use services of 0…n 
Intermediaries or 0…n Providers to run its own service. 
Examples are VMware vCloud Hybrid Service Online Marketplace, Salesforce AppExchange. 
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A Platform Market Place is similar to the Application Market Place. However, the trading object 
encompasses platform services. Therefore a Platform Market Place links services of 0…n 
Intermediaries or 0…n Providers to 0...n Intermediaries or 0…n Clients. Independent from this, the 
Platform Market Place may use services of 0…n Intermediaries or 0…n Providers to run its own 
service. 
We are not able to show this actor in a real world example. However, our interview partners 
confirmed the likeliness of its future existence. For example, a platform market place could occur 
due to licensing of platforms such as Microsoft Azure by third party providers. 
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An Infrastructure Market Place is similar to the Application Market Place. However, the trading 
object encompasses infrastructure services. Buyya et al. (2008) describe their vision of a cloud 
market with brokers that purchase cloud services for their customers. Due to high standardization, 
infrastructure exchanges may be compared to commodity exchanges which automatically map 
consumer demand with vendor offerings. An Infrastructure Market Place links services of 0…n 
Intermediaries or 0…n Providers to 0...n Intermediaries or 0…n Clients. Independent from this, the 
Infrastructure Market Place may use services of o…n Intermediaries or o…n Providers to run its own 
service. 
Example: Deutsche Boerse Cloud Exchange. 
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A Client is “the starting point of a service request and the ending point of service delivery” (Boehm 
et al. 2010). The Client solely uses products produced by its vendors and consumes these products 
outside of the cloud network. A Client receives services from 0...n Providers or 0…n Intermediaries. 
Clients mostly encompass “everyday users, Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs), and 
ambitious start-ups” (Marinos and Briscoe 2009). 
 
Table 2: Description of Risks, Hazards, and Reinforcers 
Challenge Description 
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Most customers worry about availability issues whereas cloud services have set new standards in 
high availability (Armbrust et al. 2010; Chow et al. 2009; Leavitt 2009). On the other hand, Jansen 
(2011) states that even a very high level of availability leads to a significant downtime over a year. 
That’s why Clarke (2012a) describes that “outages are not uncommon, and they may last for some 
hours”. In addition, Availability Issues also encompass connection interruptions and performance 
issues. We can distinguish between permanent and temporary availability issues (Clarke et al. 2010). 
Amazon EC2 users were affected by an outage in 2011 Clarke (2012b). 
L
o
ss
 o
f 
D
a
ta
 Loss of Data is permanent. In addition, a lack of data integrity describes “sustained correctness of 
the service, and of the data “Clarke (2012a). It can be compared to Loss of Data because the data is 
useless and is “harmful to the user and the users’ customers” (Clarke 2010). Al Zain et al. (2012) 
state that data “can suffer from damage during the transition operations from or to the cloud 
storage”. 
Innocent companies were affected by an FBI raid in computing centers against a handful of 
companies that operated out of the centers (Jansen 2011). 
P
ri
ce
 R
is
k
s 
Besides volatile prices, Price Risks include entry costs, switching costs, or operation costs (Clarke 
2012a). Clarke (2010) states that customers are dependent on the prices of their vendors. In 
addition, the data transmission of large volumes is cost intensive (Clarke 2010). We also identified 
Price Risks in the literature on financial markets that may become more relevant with the ongoing 
drive for standardization and commoditization. 
We are not able to show this risk in a real world example due to missing insights. However, our 
interview partners confirmed its existence. 
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Data Security Issues concern the security of the service itself and of company-related data. The size 
of a company has a huge impact on its Data Security, whereby large companies have higher 
investment volumes and therewith are generally more professional than small companies. However, 
they are more visible to attackers (Clarke 2010). Jansen (2011) states that data must not only be 
secured at rest but also when in transit and in use. 
We are not able to show this risk in a real world example due to missing insights. However, our 
interview partners confirmed its existence. 
D
a
ta
 
P
ri
v
a
cy
 
Is
su
e
s Data Privacy Issues describe the risk of revelation of data that does not belong to the company itself, 
such as user data. Troshani et al. (2011) mention that besides security breaches, also privacy 
breaches “can result in serious economic loss”. 
Adobe was hacked in 2013 and over 100 million user data were revealed (Blue 2013). 
H
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ec
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 Technical Defects include, hardware, software, or network issues. In addition, Chow et al. (2009) 
state that some “third-party cloud would not scale well enough to handle certain applications”. Cloud 
actors use redundancy in their infrastructure to improve availability (Armbrust et al. 2010). 
Virgin Blue's airline's check-in and online booking systems went down due to a hardware failure, 
on September 26, 2010 (Evolven 2012). 
U
se
r 
E
rr
o
rs
 User Errors involve issues such as erroneous entries of data or passwords that can be easily cracked 
and enable the access to data for outsiders. User Errors are no cloud specific risk and are widely 
discussed in existing literature, such as (Paternò and Santoro 2002). 
Clarke (2012b) mentions a user mistake that led to an outage of “Amazon IaaS” in 2011. 
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Is
su
e
s 
Security Issues include, for example, fraud, hacking, or denial of service attacks (Grobauer et al. 
2011) and originate from external attackers or from attacks within the company. Chow et al. (2009) 
state that sourcing into the cloud enlarges the attack surface of an actor. 
An example for a security issues is the leak of a huge amount of authentication names and 
passwords of Adobe users (Blue 2013). 
N
a
tu
ra
l 
D
is
a
st
er
s Natural Disasters that affect cloud actors may be, for example, earthquakes, floods, or extreme 
storms. Jansen (2011) mentions natural disasters as possible source of unplanned outages. 
A lightning strike caused a power outage that led to an outage of datacenters of Amazon and 
Microsoft near Dublin (Miller 2011). 
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Actors can be affected by demand shifts, which may be caused by strategic decisions of companies, 
bad publicity, or an outage of a competitor. The development of infrastructure exchanges will most 
likely raise the volatility of the demand side. On the other hand, supply may shift due to new players 
urging into the cloud market. Generally, in case of a Shift in Demand or Supply, several actors are 
affected. 
After Facebook bought Instagram lots of Instagram users switched to similar offerings and caused 
an overstressing of the respective infrastructure which in turn caused outages (Laurent 2013). 
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Going out of business through bankruptcy can cause permanent outage of cloud services (Armbrust 
et al. 2010; Troshani et al. 2011). Buy-outs may lead to a permanent or temporary outages, modified 
products, or a new pricing of the service. Bankruptcy and Buy-outs mostly affect small or medium 
sized cloud actors. 
Large IT companies like Oracle and IBM bought a huge amount of small/mid-size Cloud 
companies during the last years. 
L
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 Being target of regulatory actions is an important non-technical issue for cloud actors (Armbrust et 
al. 2010). In case of legal actions against a vendor or another customer of the vendor, customers may 
suffer. Furthermore, government surveillance and intellectual property disputes (Jaeger et al. 2008) 
(and hence attorney-client privilege issues) rise as additional hazards in the context of Legal Issues. 
Jansen (2011) describes that the FBI “raided computing centers in Texas and seized hundreds of 
servers, when investigating fraud allegations against a handful of companies that operated out of 
the centers”. 
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Today, cloud services often use proprietary protocols and interfaces (Dillon et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, initial service compatibility may fade over time, for example through updates, which 
makes diversification much more difficult. 
Deviant update cycles can lead to incompatibility between former compatible actors. This 
incompatibility usually lasts only a few hours/days. Usually a vendor announces its forthcoming 
changes to the customers and the customer is able to react. 
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Migration to the cloud relinquishes control over the company’s data and makes it dependent on the 
service vendor (Clarke 2010; Jansen 2011). Jansen (2011) state that actors that “subcontract some 
services to third-party service providers should raise concerns”. Cloud services are often dependent 
on a single point of failure (Armbrust et al. 2010; Chow et al. 2009). 
An outage can lead to a “cascade effect crippling all organisations dependent on that Cloud, and all 
those dependent upon them” (Marinos and Briscoe 2009). Due to the lack of transparency, an actor 
is not able to foresee such effects. 
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Large datasets at the vendor or proprietary interfaces often force customers to stay within its existing 
cloud environment (Armbrust et al. 2009). This lock-in of customers is profitable for the vendor 
(Armbrust et al. 2010) and increases the chance of opportunistic behavior on part of the vendor 
Clemons and Chen (2011). 
Armbrust et al. (2009) compute that the transfer of 10 TB of data from U.C. Berkley to Amazon in 
Seattle would last over 45 days. A batch process with a huge amount of data is unable to perform 
with this speed. Additionally, the bandwidth is often quite volatile. 
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Prater (2005) describes wrongly conditioned ERP systems in supply chain networks which cause 
“chaotic spikes” in the demand forecast of warehouse systems. Such problems, labelled Automation 
Errors, could also occur in cloud networks with automatized processes that may be wrongly 
conditioned and therefore lead to escalating risks. 
Armbrust et al. (2009) describe that blacklisting of EC2 IP addresses by spam-prevention services 
may limit which applications can be effectively hosted. 
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During the last years, data centers were built in areas with cheap energy, low temperature, and 
favorable legal position. Such preferred geological regions could pose a problem for cloud networks 
as for example natural disasters might hit different actors at the same time. 
A lightning strike caused a power outage that led to an outage of datacenters of Amazon and 
Microsoft near Dublin (Miller 2011). 
 
Table 3: Relationships between hazards and risks 
Hazard / Risk 
If a hazard affects a risk, it is marked 
with “X”. 
Data Security 
Issues 
Data Privacy 
Issues 
Price Risk Loss of Data Availability 
Issues 
Technical Defects    X X 
User Errors X X  X X 
Security Issues X X  X X 
Natural Disasters   X X X 
Legal Issues X X X X X 
Shifts in Demand and Supply   X  X 
Bankruptcy / Buy-out   X X X 
 
Table 4: Relationships between reinforcers and risks 
Reinforcer / Risk 
If a reinforcer affects a risk, it is 
marked with “X”. 
Data Security 
Issues 
Data Privacy 
Issues 
Price Risk Loss of Data Availability 
Issues 
Incompatibilities    X X 
Lack of Transparency / Loss of 
Control 
  X  X 
Unobtainability of Data / Lock-
in 
  X X X 
Automation Errors X X X X X 
Geographical Distribution of 
Network Actors 
   X X 
 
